News

Friday 2026-08-14

06:00 AM

The Fake Free Speech President Has Unleashed ICE On Its Critics [Techdirt]

It still amazes me that there are people out there who think that Donald Trump is a supporter of free speech. It has never been true. Anyone who looks will note that the Trump administration regularly engages in clearly unconstitutional attempts to suppress speech. But because he and his supporters like to claim he’s a free speech supporter, they believe it.

But here’s yet another story showing how that’s bullshit. The Wall Street Journal has a detailed report on how Trump’s personal secret police militia, ICE, is actively investigating, intimidating, and silencing people who criticize them online.

In recent months, ICE has deployed a round-the-clock digital dragnet to scour the public internet—from Facebook to Instagram to X—for speech that could endanger the agency’s mission. The government has paid millions to private contractors to surface everything from potential threats to agents to activities that could disrupt ICE’s operations, according to federal documents, contractors and former Homeland Security Investigations agents.

The program has ensnared U.S. citizens and activist groups that alert community members about ICE activity. Contractors prepare daily reports and dossiers on threat actors, identifying the poster’s name, location, date of birth, workplace, Social Security number, vehicle registration and criminal history when possible. 

To unmask anonymous online critics, DHS has sent hundreds of subpoenas to social-media companies, according to people familiar with the matter. Its agents have tracked down Americans at work and on the road, asking them to sign letters acknowledging their online speech about ICE “may” be a crime.

Criticizing ICE online is not a crime. It’s protected speech under the First Amendment. I’d point out that all of this clearly violates Trump’s early executive order on free speech, but did anyone ever take any of that seriously? It was always just red meat to throw out to his cultish base, rather than anything real.

Indeed, you can see that in the fact that the very same MAGA trolls who falsely insisted that the Biden admin was actively “censoring” people on social media will be quick to defend what ICE is doing here, even though it’s way more clearly an attack on the First Amendment rights of ICE’s critics.

DHS sent administrative subpoenas to Reddit for the information of 11 accounts that had posted “content critical of federal actions” between July and December of last year, the company’s most recent transparency reporting period, according to a person familiar with the matter.

While the article notes that Reddit (thankfully) pushed back on these requests, this is still quite different from the reports the Biden administration occasionally sent to social media companies, which tended to be much more “does this violate your rules?” not “reveal who these critics are.”

The article notes that these attacks on free speech appear to be ratcheting up as ICE and Trump grow more desperate to control the narrative around their secret police activities. That escalation now includes seeking grand jury subpoenas for critics’ information. And now that Trump gave ICE a lot more money, they’re investing millions in surveillance tech to track down online critics:

In the past year, OPR spearheaded an initiative to dramatically expand the agency’s ability to monitor online critics and potential threats, according to contractors, federal documents and former HSI agents.

Teams of contractors now scour the internet using sophisticated surveillance tools to find commentary that the agency regards as potentially dangerous.

ICE spending on surveillance technology and consultants has surged, reaching $258 million during Trump’s first full year back in the White House, a 57% increase from the same period a year prior, according to the Journal’s analysis.

ICE has inked at least six contracts that involve scanning public records for “threats,” paying out nearly $50 million since 2020. More than half those funds were obligated since last January, and another award potentially worth up to $50 million the agency continues to extend. The most recent awards call for contractors to help the agency geolocate individuals labeled as “extremists,” compile reports on individuals and cross-reference information with government databases, contracting documents show.

Of course, MAGA folks will claim they have to track down “threats,” but much of the content doesn’t sound threatening at all. For example:

… a New York poll worker named Paigelynne Gonyea received a voicemail from a man identifying himself as an agent with Homeland Security. 

“We were just calling you in reference to a post that we believe you made on Instagram where you doxxed an ICE agent back in January,” said the caller. 

Shortly after, two agents from ICE OPR arrived at the voting site where she was working. 

They held printed screenshots from her account, she said, including the post in question. The agents flipped by it quickly, she said, but she caught one thing: The post included a photo of Ross, the immigration officer who killed Good.

The file that agents were holding also contained Gonyea’s address, date of birth and what looked like a picture of her taken at airport security, she said. They told her to take down the post and asked her to sign a letter acknowledging she had been informed that she “may” have violated federal law with her social-media account.

Gonyea said she was only able to find one post that spoke about a specific ICE agent:  ”I think today is a great day for Jonathan Ross to be indicted!” the 40-year-old influencer and author had written in the post, referencing the Minnesota Star Tribune article that first named him. 

All of this is textbook behavior for thin-skinned authoritarians unwilling to tolerate even the mildest criticism. But in America, we’re supposed to have rights, including the right to free speech. But somehow all the people who claimed that Biden was suppressing speech have gone completely silent about stories like this one. Trump claiming to be the free speech president and claiming to outlaw anyone in the government from suppressing free speech means absolutely nothing as activities like the ones described here continue to happen daily.

Daily Deal: The AWS Certification Paths Bundle [Techdirt]

If you’re looking for a career in cloud computing, there’s no better place to start than with the AWS certification. Whether you want to be an Architect or a Developer, these certifications open doors to incredible opportunities. But how do you get one? You need to use realistic exam simulators that present you with questions just like the ones you might face on the actual exam. The 2026 AWS Certification Paths Bundle includes exam simulators with Performance-Based Questions (PBQs) following the Official AWS certification exam objectives. It’s on sale for $30.

Note: The Techdirt Deals Store is powered and curated by StackSocial. A portion of all sales from Techdirt Deals helps support Techdirt. The products featured do not reflect endorsements by our editorial team.

Flock (Again!) Activates A Camera System A Town Had Voted To Shut Down [Techdirt]

The easiest way to tell that Flock Safety doesn’t really care that its massive network of ALPR (automatic license plate reader) cameras is being abused by cops to stalk their exes and harass residents is to judge it by its actions. When confronted with court case after court case detailing these allegations (and those are just the cops who actually got caught!), the company says two things: first, we’re not personally responsible for the actions of “bad apples” and second, some vague “fixes” are on the way at some indeterminate point in the future.

The other way you can tell Flock doesn’t care about anything but future profitability is this: when cities pull the plug on Flock systems due to local backlash, Flock has — one more than one occasion! — decided to to simply turn the cameras back on.

Dayton, Ohio ended its contract with Flock following public complaints and some apparently forbidden sharing of data with federal immigration officers. But the city had to resort to covering Flock cameras with garbage bags to prevent further recordings since even the PD seemed unsure of whether or not it could actually control this function and Flock itself remained deliberately vague about when (or if!) it would be showing up to remove the recording equipment that contractually still belonged to it.

Dayton’s government had good reason to be concerned about Flock:

Last week, for example, the mayor of Menominee, Wisconsin said that Flock cameras in the city “have been activated without city council approval.”  

[…]

[Evanston, Illinois] previously ordered Flock to shut down 19 cameras (18 stationary and one flex camera that can be attached to a squad car) provided by the company and put its contract with Flock on a 30-day termination notice on Aug. 26. The company took down 15 of the 18 stationary cameras by Sept. 8, only to reinstall all of them by Tuesday. 

Neat, huh? That’s on top of an audit performed by the South Carolina Secretary of Transportation that found more than 200 unpermitted Flock cameras operating on public roads.

Now, we can add Littleton, Massachusetts to the growing list of Flock’s ALPR+DGAF activities:

Like in dozens of communities across the country, many Littleton residents were displeased to learn about the installation of Flock Safety’s automatic license plate-reading cameras earlier this year. In May, following backlash, town officials voted to shut down the six cameras on public roads.

Last week, police discovered Flock had restored power to the cameras without notifying the town.

The discovery, detailed in a Littleton Police Department notice this week, led the department to order the cameras remotely powered down, disable system login access for officers, and confirm a Flockwork order was in place to remove the cameras from utility poles “as soon as possible.”

That’s pretty fucked up. That’s Flock saying that not only is the customer never right but the customer shouldn’t be allowed to make their own decisions. It’s Flock unilaterally deciding that the rest of the nation’s users of Flock’s ALPR systems shouldn’t be deprived of access to Littleton’s cameras just because the entity paying for its services decided it no longer wanted to do business with Flock.

The Littleton PD did everything it could to abide by the vote and the town’s wishes. Flock, however, went the other way seemingly simply because it could. While PD officials have said this might have been the result of some miscommunication between the PD and Flock, it would seem an existing Flock work order to remove cameras would not have honestly resulted in this:

According to the statement, Littleton Police Chief Douglas Landry met with a Flock technician following the incident, and that “given the volume of vandalism and tampering incidents the company has dealt with nationally, it would not necessarily be treated as unusual on [Flock’s] end” to have a camera need to be turned back on unexpectedly.

Do what now? Flock was told to remove the cameras. Instead, Flock decided this meant it could flip the on/off switch as often as it wanted to until it actually got around to removing the cameras, due to vague concerns about backlash Flock has absolutely earned.

And I can guarantee you whatever things Flock is saying at this point, it’s only saying because it got caught. I have yet to see an incident where Flock has informed cities or PDs of inadvertent activation or illegal access. In every case, it’s always Flock making excuses after the fact for things it could have done more of to prevent (illegal access) or abusive things it did itself (re-activating/re-installing cameras) that contradicted the intent of city residents and their governments. These are not the actions of a trustworthy tech provider. These are the actions of a company that clearly believes it cannot be fucked with because it has managed to corner this market.

Thursday 2026-08-13

11:00 PM

Beating yourself up [Seth Godin's Blog on marketing, tribes and respect]

Is it helping?

You wouldn’t stay by passively if someone else was beating you up.

Perhaps we shouldn’t accept it when we do it.

      

‘Trump Said A Thing’ Journalism Must Stop [Techdirt]

One obvious byproduct of letting what’s left of U.S. journalism consolidate in the hands of a bunch of giant corporations is the end result winds up being a feckless mess. Generally corporations don’t want to upset advertisers, ownership (usually Conservative, white, and male), event sponsors, or potential advertising targets, so their journalism winds up being hollow, performative, and toothless.

One end result of this is something I affectionately call “CEO said a thing!” journalism, which kind of looks like journalism, but generally involves mindlessly parroting whatever a wealthy executive (or politician) says without context, correction, or even third-party objective analysis.

You’ll endlessly see this in corporate press coverage of corporations and tech. But it’s more generally reflected in their coverage of all rich men. Especially guys like Elon Musk or Donald Trump, who have found it incredibly easy to manipulate what’s left of our press into parroting every brain fart they have, regardless of whether there’s any useful new information or meaningful tether to factual reality.

This has been on particularly proud display when it comes to Trump and his unpopular and pointless war in Iran, with each week bringing a new headline of a plan that doesn’t exist, a pivot that never happened, or a strategy that isn’t coherent — or even real. The U.S. press, with occasional refreshing exception, endlessly just repeats whatever Trump says, regardless of whether what he’s saying is useful, real, or true.

Media critic Dan Froomkin has it right when he calls for a moratorium on “Trump says” headlines where every statement by our mad idiot king is mindlessly repeated without context or correction:

“It’s simple: Newsroom leaders should ban headlines based on what Trump says if there is legitimate reason to suspect that he may not be relating truthful, accurate, and durable information.

I’m only a tiny bit more tolerant of the Trump “claims”, “maintains”, “blames”, and “insists” headlines, but at least those impart an iota of doubt.”

The problem is this has been going on for generations. We’re more than ten years into Trump authoritarianism and propaganda. There’s no more room for giving meaningful credence to the idea that newsrooms and top editors are doing this simply because they don’t know any better.

They do this because corporate consolidated media isn’t interested in truth-telling journalism, they’re interesting in journalistic simulacrum and infotainment kayfabe that props up the interests and values of the extraction class. The public interest, hard-nosed journalism, and a properly informed electorate is the last thing on these gentlemen’s minds.

This isn’t some funny accident and it’s not subtle. Republicans and most rich white men are treated with kid gloves by 75% of the U.S. press because the corporations that own what’s left of these companies don’t want to rock the boat. They want their latest giant shitty merger approved. Their ownership likes tax cuts. Journalism that tells the truth isn’t what they’re here for.

Froomkin remains hopeful all the same:

“Surely our top newsroom leaders don’t see themselves as being in the business of spreading disinformation. But that’s what happens when they use the headlines and the tops of their articles to tell us what “Trump says” without caveats or pushback — when their headlines and leads should instead be devoted primarily to those caveats and pushbacks.”

Froomkin is right, though I’d argue this isn’t something that a compelling letter to the editor can fix. This sort of abject cowardice is systemic and by design. And while there’s still great journalism that can occur at many modern media companies, it’s increasingly becoming the exception, not the rule. We’re not debating our way out of this. The fix is massive structural reform.

The fixes are obvious and have always been there, and they involve things large media company owners don’t like: like reforged media consolidation limits, real antitrust enforcement, media ownership diversity requirements, improved media literacy and education standards (an informed audience that demands more of our journalistic institutions can shape coverage), a restoration of U.S. public media, and creative new funding models for real independent, worker-owned (and inevitably unionized) journalism.

We’re way past the point where we can assume this isn’t intentional, or can believe that simply asking better of these companies will result in the outcomes we’re all looking for.

Kanji of the Day: 縦 [Kanji of the Day]

✍16

小6

vertical, length, height, self-indulgent, wayward

ジュウ

たて

操縦   (そうじゅう)   —   steering
縦横   (じゅうおう)   —   length and width
縦横無尽   (じゅうおうむじん)   —   freely
縦断   (じゅうだん)   —   running through (north-south)
縦割り   (たてわり)   —   dividing vertically
縦型   (たてがた)   —   vertical
操縦士   (そうじゅうし)   —   pilot
縦割り行政   (たてわりぎょうせい)   —   vertically segmented administrative system
縦貫   (じゅうかん)   —   running through
副操縦士   (ふくそうじゅうし)   —   copilot

Generated with kanjioftheday by Douglas Perkins.

Kanji of the Day: 敏 [Kanji of the Day]

✍10

中学

cleverness, agile, alert

ビン

さとい

敏感   (びんかん)   —   sensitive
過敏   (かびん)   —   nervousness
敏感肌   (びんかんはだ)   —   sensitive skin
機敏   (きびん)   —   smart
俊敏   (しゅんびん)   —   quick-witted and agile
過敏症   (かびんしょう)   —   hypersensitivity
敏腕   (びんわん)   —   ability
鋭敏   (えいびん)   —   sharp
敏捷   (びんしょう)   —   nimble
神経過敏   (しんけいかびん)   —   oversensitive

Generated with kanjioftheday by Douglas Perkins.

01:00 PM

John Oliver Doubles Down After Latest Buc-ee’s Trademark Bullying Lawsuit [Techdirt]

The Buc-ee’s trademark bullying saga continues! The company, once best known for building ridiculously enormous gas station and convenience store combinations has more recently become nearly as infamous for its bullying and litigious behavior. Buc-ee’s has a habit of suing all kinds of other businesses for trademark infringement, so long as those other businesses use cartoon animals in their logos, or have any kind of reference to beavers in their name and branding. John Oliver and his crew on Last Week Tonight recently caught wind of all of this and decided to poke the beaver in the eye, spinning up their own store featuring clothing with its anthropomorphic squirrel mascot on it and text that reads “Buc Off!”, and closed that segment begging Buc-ee’s to file suit over it all.

The company didn’t do so. Instead, they continued their trademark bullying ways and sued a small convenience store in Beavercreek, Ohio, called Beaver’s Mini Mart. Notably, that store has been doing business for many years and Buc-ee’s only recently opened a location 16 miles or so away.

If you thought this would somehow escape Oliver and his team, you were wrong. Oliver once again closed his latest show with the same topic.

But in Last Week Tonight’s Aug. 9 episode, Oliver doubled down, extending the timeline of Buc-Off merch sales in response to Buc-ee’s suing Beaver’s Mini Mart in Ohio.

“The good news is we’ve raised almost half a million dollars for Hunger Free America so far,” Oliver said. “The bad news is it doesn’t seem Buc-ee’s got the message, because apparently they’re at it again. Yep, turns out, they’re still filing lawsuits,” Oliver continued. “You might be trying to name the Buc-ee’s beaver Mitch McConnell, because it seems this b—h will not quit.”

You can see the clip below if you have an HBO subscription (the link is for the whole episode, but it should start at the 31 minute mark).

Oliver recounts several details why this latest lawsuit is so stupid. The name of the town. The way the company is pissing off the local residents and causing them to rally around the local convenience store. The bad press. And, lastly, drawing the continued ire of Last Week Tonight, which seems dedicated to continuing to point out just how shitty Buc-ee’s is being in all of this.

Oliver noted that while the Buc-Off online store was supposed to close Sept. 8, it is “staying f–king open” for as long as Buc-ee’s is suing Beaver’s Mini Mart. Chron has reached out to Buc-ee’s legal counsel for comment. 

Before the episode ended, Last Week Tonight mascot Mr. Nutterbutter made an appearance in a Beaver’s Mini Mart T-shirt. When the mascot made a sad gesture, Oliver asked if he was disappointed that the travel stop still hadn’t sued them. When Mr. Nutterbutter said yes, Oliver had words of reassurance for the giant squirrel. 

“It could still happen,” Oliver said. “Especially because our store is still open.”

I can only hope that Buc-ee’s’ plan to wait for Oliver to get bored of all of this doesn’t work.

10:00 AM

Madagascar [dperkins]

It takes a long time to get to Madagascar and equally long to get around once you're there. The plane flight takes forever and the local roads are shockingly rough. Betsy and Dex and I went for a three-week trip to see what we could see. We went, in order, to the southwest, the southeast, the west, and the east.

20260810.1.Madagascar.png 20260810.2.Madagascar.png 20260810.3.Madagascar.png

Isalo National Park and Anja Nature Reserve are in the dry southern highlands. Local ranchers raise zebu (indecine cattle) for food, and zebu is a staple of Malagasy cuisine (along with rice and beans), but up in the mountains there is other wildlife to be seen. The pachy podium (bottle tree) has an exotic look, and animals we saw include the ring-tailed lemur, brown lemur, Verreaux's sifaka (white sifaka), magpie robins, and a variety of chameleons.

20260723.1.Isalo.jpg 20260725.1.Road.jpg 20260725.2.Anja.jpg 20260725.3.Chameleon.jpg 20260725.4.Lemur.jpg 20260725.5.Lemur.jpg 20260730.1.Paradise.jpg

After several days in the highlands we drove east to Ranomafana National Park. Jungle lighting isn't ideal for amateur photography, but we got to see a lot over two night walks and also two day hikes, such as the blue-legged chameleon, O'Shaughnessy chameleon, elephant eared chameleon, nose-horned chameleon, brown mouse lemur, woolly lemur, golden bamboo lemur, Milne-Edwards' sifaka, black and white ruffed lemur (which looked like Dex with his wild beard and hair), red-fronted brown lemur, ring-tailed mongoose (which is not actually a mongoose), common bush brown butterfly, eyed ringlet butterfly, paradise flycatcher, pitta-like ground roller, red-tailed vanga, white-headed vanga, and a ridiculously well-camouflaged leaf-tail gecko.

After that, we drove to Antsirabe one day, Antananarivo the next, and took a day trip to King Andrianampoinimerina's summer palace in Ambohimanga before flying west to Morondava.

20260801.1.Morondava.jpg 20260801.2.Baobab.jpg 20260802.1.Ferry.jpg 20260802.2.Sunset.jpg 20260804.1.Sunset.jpg 20260804.3.Tsingy.jpg 20260804.4.Tsingy.jpg 20260805.1.Manambolo.jpg 20260805.2.Forest.jpg

National Route 8 is a national highway, or so it says on the map, but if you were to drive north from Morondava, not long after passing Avenue of the Baobabs and Baobab Forest the road turns into a dusty jeep track. Then, just for extra adventure, there are two river crossings (the Tsiribihina River and the Manambolo River). Of course there are no bridges. Instead, the locals have fabricated ferries by strapping logs and metal bars across a couple of boats. When you get to the ferry, you get out of your car and watch your driver drive onto the boat, wondering if this car will join several others than have fallen off the ferry and into the muddy river bottom below. Most of the time, nothing so disastrous happens, so you get on the ferry, as we did, and continue on til evening. Right in the middle of the day we had lunch at the Mad Zebu, said (by some) to be the best restaurant in Madagascar. Certainly I was impressed with the food.

The next two days we visited Tsingy de Bemaraha National Park. The tsingy is a karstic rock formation where the limestone has vertical lines and sharp points at the top. There are two tsingy formations in this park and some others farther north in the country. We went on a canoe ride and hike (Petit Tsingy) our first day, and then a longer hike (Grand Tsingy) our second day. The focus here was geology, because Dex is a geologist, but biology was there for the viewing, too: the pachy podium, juba tree, strangle fig, black-winged stilt, knob-billed duck, dimorphic egret, Manavi long-fingered bat, green pigeon, forest rock thrush, paradise flycatcher, Madagascar coucal, crested coua, Malagasy giant chameleon (furcifer oustaleti), green gecko, antlion, and (because it's Madagascar) Decken's sifaka (white sifaka) and a red-tailed sportive lemur. The lemur is nocturnal, and we spotted it sitting sleepily in a tree nook, hoping we'd quickly leave. Which we did, because the Grand Tsingy was waiting, and along with checking out the limestone, we got to squeeze through cracks and crawl under things and climb up ladders and all sorts of strenuous activities. It's a beautiful area.

The road south was somehow worse than the road north. One aggravating factor is that somebody shot our car while we were driving along. That was a first for all of us. Fortunately, the bullet hit the driver's door and not the driver's window. At the time we didn't know what it was... We heard the noise and thought maybe the car is breaking (which happens a lot on that road) or a rock bounced off something (which happens a lot on that road), but some minutes later when we stopped for lunch, the bullet-shaped dent in the side panel was plain to see. Apparently that stretch of the road used to be even worse, the locals said, before they opened a new army base nearby. Anyway, after lunch at a fine French restaurant and another ferry ride, we continued south, and not long after the Baobab Forest the car broke down (which happens a lot on that road). Our driver had all the parts in the back, so he jacked it up, replaced the left-front bearing, lowered it down, and we hit the road an hour later, passed Avenue of the Baobabs just after sunset, and returned to Morondava for the evening. That was National Route 8.

20260807.1.Brown.jpg 20260808.1.Elephant.jpg

For the last leg of the trip, we flew to Antananarivo and drove east to Andasibe. The rain forest was similar to Ranomafana, but it's farther north, so you get to see different wildlife. We encountered the Goldman's mouse lemur, woolly lemur, brown lemur, diademed sifaka (golden sifaka), indri indri, elephant eared chameleon, and various birds. The indri indri sing in harmony several times each day. Going out to see wildlife is always a dice roll; even with experience guides (which we had), there are no guarantees for what you'll see on any given day. But overall, with multiple days and nights in multiple jungles, we got to see our fair share of the wildlife. A lot of these animals are only endemic to Madagascar (as the guides like to mention), so if you want to see them in the wild, take a trip down here someday.

Cater Dictator [The Status Kuo]

Photo by Alex Brandon / AP

Air Force One is back in the news, but not for a reason anyone predicted. On Monday, the Washington Post reported that Donald Trump (checks notes) hid in a catering cart in order to secretly switch planes and thwart a credible assassination threat from Iran.

Amazing memes aside, the story is actually about something much bigger. It started a month earlier with a New York Times report that, at the time, looked routine.

In July, the Times reported that Trump flew out of Turkey on the old Air Force One rather than his newly retrofitted, Qatari-donated jet, citing a security precaution tied to renewed hostilities with Iran. ABC News independently confirmed that the Secret Service had urged the switch, citing differences in the two jets’ security capabilities.

That’s hardly a bombshell. Concerns about the jet’s rushed retrofit had been public since the Pentagon formally accepted the gift in May 2025 when, as the Times noted, Air Force Secretary Troy Meink estimated the security modifications alone would cost “probably less than $400 million.”

But two days later, after Trump reportedly erupted over the story, the Department of Justice went full throttle, subpoenaing four Times reporters and demanding they reveal who had leaked the story to them. I covered the spectacular collapse of the subpoenas in federal court in an earlier piece: Federal agents delivered subpoenas to some reporters at their homes and later sought the phone records of reporters’ family members before withdrawing everything under a skeptical judge’s questioning.

But one question still tugged at my brain. Why would a story confirming what everyone already suspected about the new jet provoke Trump so much that the DOJ had to subpoena reporters?

The Post’s Monday night report about The Man in the Food Service Truck may have answered that question.

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Putting the ass inside the cart

Per the Post and a follow-up piece by the Times, Trump’s departure from the NATO summit in Ankara last month looked ordinary. He boarded the old Air Force One through the left-side door in full view of a camera positioned to catch the moment, while journalists traveling with him rushed to board using stairs at the back of the plane, catching only a glimpse of him.

Minutes later, an airport catering container, the kind normally used to load meals before departure, was lifted to the opposite side of the plane from where the press had boarded. It transported Trump to a third aircraft, an Air Force C-32A, which flew him to Britain in secret. According to the Post, only a small circle of officials knew the plan, including Gen. Dan Caine, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, who boarded the C-32A separately.

As journalists settled into their seats on the old Air Force One, believing Trump was aboard, a pool report noted: “We have been advised to keep our window shades in the press cabin closed.” None realized the man they’d just glimpsed boarding was no longer on the plane.

The old Air Force One landed at RAF Mildenhall at 10:16 p.m. Forty minutes later, Trump reappeared. He had been transferred from the C-32A back to the old Air Force One, where he boarded through one entrance and emerged through the upper left-side door as usual. To the small group of reporters watching from the tarmac, nothing appeared amiss. From there, he walked to the Qatari jet, with the press pool following behind him, for the flight home.

Reporters who had spent the flight from Turkey believing they were traveling with the president had no reason to think otherwise when he reappeared on the tarmac at Mildenhall and walked to the Qatari jet. The ruse was built to look ordinary from where they stood, and it worked: They wouldn’t learn Trump had never been on their plane until the story broke five weeks later.

That’s outrageous! No, it’s amazing!

Presidential historian Garrett Graff called the deception of the entire press corps likely “unprecedented in modern presidential history,” telling one outlet that lying to reporters about the president’s whereabouts amounted to “a new Rubicon that’s being crossed.”

MAGA commentator Scott Jennings predictably defended the operation, writing that he was “glad our security teams did whatever it took, including the extraordinary cloak-and-dagger maneuvers,” to keep Trump safe. RedState went further in an opinion piece, arguing that reporters accept the risks of traveling with the president and that the deception worked exactly as intended.

The image of an 80-year-old president smuggled off Air Force One in a food-service container proved too rich for the internet to leave alone. Within hours, the story had spawned its own meme genre (and once again given me no shortage of material for my Saturday funnies). Some rebranded the episode “Catering Truck One,” circulating AI-generated images of Trump tucked among fry cartons and stacked dinner trays.

A complicated timeline

Operation “Where’s the Beef?” (I’m still workshopping this) unfolded amid renewed hostilities with Iran. The New York Times reported that the deception plan came together in a matter of hours once officials determined the threat against Trump was credible. But the specific nature of that threat first became public two and a half weeks earlier.

On July 24, CBS News reported that U.S. officials had detected a credible plot to fire a missile at the plane carrying Trump, prompting the Secret Service to swap him onto the older jet as a precaution. CBS added that the legacy Air Force One carries laser countermeasures designed to misdirect an incoming missile, technology whose presence on the newer Qatari jet remains unclear.

That July 24 CBS report landed the day after a federal judge in Manhattan pressed DOJ lawyers over the subpoenas issued to Times reporters, and after the government had withdrawn the subpoenas during the hearing. Seventeen days passed before the far more consequential fact emerged on Aug. 10 per the Post and the Times: Trump was never on the plane that left Turkey publicly identified as his, and the press and staff aboard it were, functionally, live decoys for a threat officials believed was real.

The Aug. 10 reporting also added an important wrinkle: The threat from Iran was not specific to the Qatari-donated jet. Trump reportedly was targeted on whatever airplane he happened to be flying. That means the old Air Force One wasn’t merely a less-flashy backup; it was just as exposed to the threat as any other aircraft he might have chosen, likely explaining why officials still felt the need to get him off it in secret.

Trump has said publicly, though only after the fact, that he considers himself Iran’s top target. Asked by reporters on the flight home why the window shades had been ordered shut, he said he knew of no specific threat but described himself as under constant siege from Iran. “I’m number one on their list, before you,” he told the reporters. “But if I go, you go. Right?”

What was Trump really after?

Let’s pull these threads together.

By Tuesday morning, two ostensibly separate stories from the past month had collided. One was the July subpoena fight over reporting that the Qatari jet had security gaps, which ended with the government withdrawing everything under a federal judge’s questioning. The other was the Aug. 10 revelation that Trump’s exit from Turkey had involved a catering truck, a secret third plane and a press pool that had unknowingly flown as a decoy.

Legal journalist Chris Geidner was among the first to argue that these were not two stories at all, but one. He notes that the White House appears to have let the press publish Trump’s exact whereabouts, just as it normally does when the press pool travels with him aboard Air Force One. But in this case, amid a credible assassination threat possibly involving an Iranian missile attack, that’s precisely the information that could have threatened the very aircraft the press was on. Geidner stops short of asserting that the subpoenas were intended to conceal the ruse, calling it instead a set of open questions about what the DOJ, then-U.S. Attorney Jay Clayton’s office and the White House actually knew.

The Times’ Aug. 10 story adds a detail Geidner didn’t cover. When the paper first reported the jet’s uncertain defenses on July 8, White House spokesperson Steven Cheung’s statement defending Trump’s security included the line “we use every tool at our disposal—including distraction and misdirection—to address those threats.” The words “distraction and misdirection” mean a lot more today than they did then. But curiously, when the Times returned to the subject in its Aug. 10 story, the White House reissued the same statement with the phrase “including distraction and misdirection” removed without comment.

All this still leaves a bigger question unanswered. Why would a story in July confirming previously reported defensive gaps provoke Trump’s fury, prompting the DOJ to overstep and seek subpoenas from the press and their families? It was no secret that the new Qatari jet wasn’t up to snuff in its defensive capabilities. So the content of the leak doesn’t explain the freak-out. But the fact that someone was leaking to the press does.

Whoever briefed reporters on the Qatari jet’s defensive capabilities had access to operational security details about the president’s aircraft. That access might also have extended to top-secret information about how Trump was spirited away in a catering truck and secretly put aboard a third plane. From the White House’s vantage point, the Times’ July 8 story wasn’t the danger. The source behind it was.

Seen in this light, subpoenaing the reporters reads less like an attempt to punish an old story and more like an attempt to find and shut down whoever was in a position to tell a much bigger one before they did.

Five weeks later, that bigger story ran anyway.

08:00 AM

Not Ready For Prime Time: The Current State Of Legal Ethics And AI [Techdirt]

I’ve been presenting at UC Law San Francisco Lexlab Law and AI certificate program its past several sessions, as well as some law school classes, on whether lawyers’ use of AI complies with the rules of professional conduct governing how lawyers must comport themselves or risk losing their licenses. The legal industry is keen to reap many of the benefits AI promises, such as streamlining some of the more arduous parts of the job and potentially making legal representation more affordable and/or profitable. And tech vendors are keen to profit from selling their AI systems to this market.

But neither constituency can benefit unless the way AI is used is consistent with those ethical rules. They exist for a reason—to make sure clients’ interests are prioritized and protected—and nothing about AI obviates their need or applicability. As lawyers start to roll these tools into their practice they need to make sure it’s not in a way that violates those rules, and for those vendors eager to sell their tools to the legal profession, they are going to need to make sure they are designed in a way where their use does not.

And we are not yet at a place where compliance can be presumed when AI tools are used. AI use by lawyers remains highly problematic for at least two big reasons: the current unreliability of AI outputs, and the tendency for AI to consume, store, and reuse data it is exposed to, even if that data needs to remain private. With regard to the former issue, the reliability concerns go beyond just the problem of hallucinated citations appearing in legal briefs; it is still the case that clients hire lawyers for their judgment, which so far AI still cannot replace. Maybe someday if AI has developed into something truly autonomous we could simply demand that it take the bar and be accountable to clients like human lawyers currently are, but since that day is not yet here it is critically important that lawyers not abdicate their own judgment in favor of whatever an AI tool might produce. Clients are depending on them, their lawyers, and they remain fully accountable to serve them as the profession requires.

And with regard to the data protection issue, it remains true for any tool lawyers use, AI-based or not: lawyers need to make sure that the tool use does not compromise client information, which they have a duty to protect because really bad things can happen to the client when privacy is not preserved. But AI tools in particular are notoriously greedy about collecting, retaining, and reusing whatever information they can access, unless they are specifically designed not to do so. It is thus critically important for lawyers to make sure that whatever tool they use—including and especially an AI tool—does not have the ability to mishandle or misappropriate client data to which it is exposed.

Each of these major issues then reverberates in a number of the specific ethical rules governing lawyers that they need to abide by. What follows is a closer examination of some of the ways they do.


There are a few things to note at the outset. First, there are more rules governing lawyers than what have been included in the analysis here, such as those relating to the duty to uphold the reputation of the profession, or those relating to advertising, which AI can also implicate. But the ones included are some of the major ones and examples of how AI use can rule afoul of them.

It’s also important to note that the rules can work together, and sometimes are in tension. The duty of zealous advocacy, for instance, can sometimes be at odds with the duty of candor. But AI does not itself resolve those ethical questions. Instead what is important to realize is that an AI use might implicate more than one rule.

As for the rules themselves, although they are rooted in some longstanding principles, what governs lawyers today are a set of model rules the American Bar Association promulgated in 1983 and pretty much every state has since adopted in some form. Because they can vary somewhat in how they were adopted by each state, lawyers need to consult the specific language their state has used to know how the rules apply to them, along with any other guidance and commentary their state’s lawyer regulators have produced. In fact, many states are also busy updating this guidance in order to specifically apply it to lawyer AI use (as is the ABA). But the basic gist of each rule is largely the same for all lawyers and based on the model language articulated by the ABA originally.

These rules also apply to all lawyers and not just litigators. Even transactional, or deal-making, lawyers need to follow them, and so do in-house counsel, who still have clients they owe duties towards, even if it is just one client. So when they declare, on behalf of their client—as, alarmingly, many have—that they will only hire law firms that use AI it is fair to question whether such a priority is indeed consistent with their ethical duties. Perhaps in individual circumstances such an AI-using firm might be preferable, but it won’t be universal; it will depends on the task the lawyers are being engaged to help with and what specific tools they are using. It would after all be contrary to the client’s interests to engage a firm that used an AI tool that compromised the confidentiality of the client’s sensitive information. Plus there remains the question of whether the AI tool being used is really one that can help the job get done in a way that can be trusted, let alone with the savings the client is hoping to see, given the time needed to verify its output.

Rule 1.1: Competence. If you are going to be engaged as a lawyer, you must make sure you know how to do the job, however you find yourself called to do it. Traditionally the duty of competence has, for example, meant that a lawyer could not take on a matter in an unfamiliar area of law, like criminal defense when they were an estate planner (or vice versa), but the rule is not limited to just those situations. Case hallucinations strike at the heart of it, for instance. If you are advocating for a client, you need to know the law relevant to the client’s situation, and if you are submitting hallucinated cases that don’t exist, it strongly suggests that you do not, or else you would have known they were imagined. Which is one reason AI cannot suddenly expand the types of matters a lawyer can take on—it’s simply not reliable enough on its own. The lawyer will still need to know when it is giving good answers and when it is not, but if the lawyer does not already have that competence themselves, then they won’t be able to make that determination.

There is also a related concept that is becoming more and more important to the legal profession: technical competence. Do you know how to effectively use the tools you are using? The answer needs to be yes, particularly to ensure that your tool use is not creating problems you were not aware of, especially with respect to protecting client data. As discussed further below, lawyers have a duty to protect client information, which means they need to know how to use their digital tools properly to ensure it remains protected. Concerns about technical competency predate AI, given the risk of potential hacker exfiltration, but they apply just as readily to an AI system exposed to client data that may then train on it.

Rule 1.3: Diligence. This duty goes hand in hand with the duty of competency but requires a bit more. It’s a lawyer’s job to do the job. And the whole job, not just the bits of the job they like best. One supposed promise of AI is that it can increase the volume of matters a lawyer can take on. But can it actually? Because on each matter it will still be the lawyer’s judgment on the line. So while AI might offer some time savings on certain tasks associated with a representation, and that might seem to create capacity to take on more matters, the lawyer will still need to have the bandwidth to competently provide any representation they’ve been engaged to provide. There are physical limits to what one lawyer can do, even with the help of AI, and especially given that they still need to be able to review whatever results an AI tool might give them to help along the way and that supervisory function will also require time.

This diligence rule also incorporates the general lawyer duty of zealous advocacy. Before relying too heavily on an AI tool, one needs to ask whether an AI can actually itself deliver zealous advocacy. Can it deliver all the strategic thinking needed to look out for the client and their objectives in evolving circumstances? And would whatever it recommended also comport with the rest of the ethical rules? If the AI can’t meet all those requirements—and it’s doubtful whether any truly can right now—the lawyer will still need to.

There is also a new wrinkle developing with respect to this rule and case hallucinations: increasingly courts are imposing a duty on litigators to police their opponents’ briefs for false citations. If they do not, they may not be able to recover fees for litigating against the fiction once they are finally brought to the court’s attention. Diligence appears to now require that sort of review (although in some instances it is framed as part of the duty of competence).

Rule 1.4: Communications. Clients are entitled to be kept apprised of how things are going with their representation and be able to contribute to it. On the one hand, if AI does create some time savings for lawyers, it may help ensure they have more time to communicate with clients. But if AI is used in a way that replaces lawyer judgment, and, worse, is applied to tasks where it performs them in a way that lacks adequate transparency, then clients won’t be given enough information such that they can assist with their own representation. The lack of transparency is especially an issue for agentic AI, where instead of manually working with an AI a step at the time the lawyer is trusting the AI to do a more complex task, because the AI may not even realize that it needs to report out what it has already done and be able to get more input before proceeding.

Furthermore, applying AI to client communications themselves also raises the risk of exposing confidential client information. Such a task would inevitably require the AI to learn about the client in order to know what to tell them, but if what it learns does not stay local to the law firm then its confidentiality is no longer protected.

Rule 1.5: Fees. This rule requires lawyer fees to be reasonable, which some have suggested may require using AI. The thinking is that if technology makes some lawyer tasks more efficient, it would be unreasonable to bill for the time taken to perform the tasks without the technology. And as a general proposition this view may be correct: we may, for instance, no longer consider it reasonable to bill for the time needed to research in a law library when so much information is now digitized. But it does not follow that using AI is similarly necessary to use, especially not when there are so many issues still associated with its use. Indeed, it’s even questionable whether it can provide true savings given that lawyers must still take the time to review anything resulting from an AI tool before it is relied upon. Perhaps in some in some situations there can be a savings, but, given the current state of the technology, the savings are not nearly certain enough at this point to support the inference that AI use is something that must be implicitly required.

There also is a side issue of when the costs associated with AI use can be passed through to a client. The answer may depend on guidance from the specific state regulating the lawyer, but there is some precedent, from the period when lawyers started regularly adopting Lexis and Westlaw research tools, and on fixed subscription rates, that technology services that are paid at a flat rate cannot be pro-rated among clients, and only costs directly associated with a client’s representation can be passed through to the client on their bill, at least not without the client’s prior written consent.

And it should not need to be said, but apparently, given some known cases it must be: if the AI use does in fact result in a time savings, then the client gets the benefit of those savings. Lawyers cannot bill for the time it would have taken to perform the task without the AI, only the time it did take, even if it went faster thanks to the AI.

Rule 1.6: Confidentiality of Information. This rule, in many ways, is the ballgame. If a technical tool, including AI, cannot protect the confidentiality of client communications, then it cannot be used by lawyers.

This rule is broader than attorney-client privilege, although AI that doesn’t protect client confidentiality may fail to protect attorney-client privilege as well. The principle behind this rule is that clients can’t get effective representation from their lawyers unless they can be candid with them. Which means that lawyers end up as vessels for all sorts of sensitive information that clients need to feel safe divulging. This rule helps make it safe for them to divulge it. It also applies to any information a client divulges, including their identity. If any such information is going to be shared with an AI, it can only be with an AI tool that can be trusted to maintain its secrecy, which means likely not uploading it anywhere and certainly not using it for any later purpose that won’t be local, such as training.

Which right away means that general purpose, freely available AI tools more than likely are unsuitable for legal work. There has already been at least one judicial ruling finding that the terms of service of one such tool dispelled any reasonable belief that confidentiality would be protected. It is incumbent on lawyers—including as part of their technical competency—to review the terms of service and privacy policy of whatever AI tool they want to use to understand if there’s any danger of information associated with the client’s representation leaving the control of the lawyer. It will also likely necessitate lawyers using only paid versions of AI products in order avail themselves of ones with terms of service that are adequately protective—and it will need to be only the right paid product, as there can be critical differences in privacy practices even among one vendor’s family of paid products. Which does unfortunately raise the issue that it may be only large law firms who will be able to afford using AI products that provide adequate assurance on an enterprise level, and smaller firms only able to afford “business” packages will be left out of being able to use AI.

There is also the unfortunate situation that clients may already be inadvertently waiving their own potential attorney client privilege by uploading information to AI systems—especially free ones—to ask them questions or even just have them collate their information into a more usable form. In addition to the issues associated with relying on the AI’s output, it means their private business may have just been absorbed into the larger system and now be discoverable by others. This ship may be sailing before clients engage their lawyers, but once engaged lawyers may have an obligation to educate their clients not to use AI this way because it risks losing attorney-client and work product protection, and as a practical matter may make information findable by an adversary. In fact, consider whether as part of a lawyer’s zealous advocacy they might have the obligation to ask AI about their opponent’s business, to see what information has already been revealed. On the other hand, lawyers should be aware that courts are considering whether their own AI prompts may be discoverable. Perhaps not, as work product or privileged, but it is an evolving area.

Rules 1.7-1:11: Conflict of Interest. Conflicts of interest are of serious concern to the lawyering profession. We need to make sure that lawyers are committed to zealously advocating for their clients and not pull their punches out of a sense of loyalty to someone else or some other interest. How AI may implicate these rules is something still developing, but one way to be aware of again relates to protecting client confidentiality, because it is conceivably possible that if an AI trains on client information, it may learn sensitive information about that client that later AI use may reveal, possibly in a context adverse to them.

Rule 3.3: Candor toward the Tribunal. This rule is about the integrity of the legal process. We’ve built a system where the idea is that with all the facts and law on the table, we’ll be able to reach a just conclusion. Reality may or may not be so simple, but this rule is about making sure the process has the best quality of facts and law available to it.

On the facts front, concerns are coming up more often, such as in the context of AI-generated police reports, and we’ve even had occasions where expert reports ended up with hallucinations, and another occasion where a lawyer was just trying to get AI to format a citation, and instead the AI went ahead and hallucinated a whole cited source. There is also a report from Brazil where a lawyer wrote a brief with hidden white-on-white text intended to do an injection prompt on any AI system the brief was run through. The court deemed it an act “offensive to the dignity of justice” and the lawyers were sanctioned.

And then there is the question of hallucinated law, which seems to be an epidemic. Note that the issue here is not just invented citations for fake cases but bad summaries of holdings from actual cases, or otherwise invented quotes. Even taking AI off the table this rule about candor already obligates a lawyer to disclose to the court adverse authority. This obligation persists even in the face of the duty for zealous advocacy, although it can provide an opportunity for effective advocacy to be so candid because if that adverse authority is out there, the opponent might dig it up, so the duty to be candid gives the lawyer the ethical space to get out in front of it and try to minimize its effect. But the point of this rule is to make sure the court has the benefit of all the law it needs to consider in reaching a just result, which is why it would violate it to give it hallucinated law that at best obscures applicable law, if not outright deceives the court.

The strange thing though is that it apparently needs to be said that not only should lawyers not deceive courts by submitting briefs with hallucinated citations, but, once called out for it, the solution is not to double-down and submit even more hallucinations in briefs arguing why the lawyer should not be sanctioned for the first hallucinations. Oddly, such behavior seems to be happening a lot, and these cases are where the resulting sanctions have so far been most severe.

Rule 3.4: Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel. This rule joins the duty of candor to also help make sure our adversarial system can function. But it applies to more than just legal filings; it is intended to discourage obstructive strategy altogether, including by not depriving opponents of evidence they are entitled to.

Which matters, because one use of AI is in support of document review and production. Quicker and more cost-effective document review is a white whale many hope AI can finally slay, but there is a danger in presuming that it has already replaced the need for human review. It may be able to make it more efficient by clumping up documents based on the likelihood of them being relevant or privileged, but there are consequences to not getting attorney judgment to make the final call, including potentially waiving privilege, overproducing, or under-producing and ending up subject to sanctions. And the risk remains: as the AI is learning, what is happening to the client information it is learning?

Rule 5.1: Responsibilities of Partners, Managers, and Supervisory Lawyers. It is not enough for a lawyer to just be ethical on their own; they are also responsible for the ethical conduct of those who work with and for them. Courts are increasingly sanctioning not just lawyers who have submitted briefs with hallucinated citations but also their bosses and law firms, as well as co-counsel. Law firms need to have policies about what AI use is acceptable and make sure everyone is trained on it, which also means that if someone wants to use a new tool, it has to be vetted first to make sure it can be trusted by any lawyer at the firm. Furthermore, lawyers need to be judicious about what other lawyers they co-counsel with or sponsor for pro hac admission to their local court, because any name on a brief will be responsible for its content.

This supervision obligation is also why lawyers cannot simply rely on output an AI tool generates; they must verify it. And they must use non-AI systems to do it, so that if bad information has corrupted the original AI tool, the system that’s used to verify the results won’t be vulnerable to the same corruption.

Rule 5.3: Responsibilities Regarding Nonlawyer Assistance. Supervisory duties do not just involve other lawyers; lawyer are also responsible for non-lawyers who work with and for them. For instance, if a firm secretary steals client funds, the lawyers are on the hook, because it is there duty to make sure such things don’t happen. It also means they need to manage vendors that they would outsource any work to, such as printers and document review vendors, as well as any technology vendors, including AI vendors, all of whom need to be vetted to see if they can be trusted with the sensitive material they will inevitably work with.

Rule 5.4: Professional Independence of a Lawyer. There’s also a rule that law firms can’t be owned by non-lawyers. The reason for this rule is the same as the reason for the conflicts of interest rules: it is critically important that lawyers have no incentive to do anything but zealously advocate for their clients. The fear is that, if firms could be owned by non-lawyers, then the profit pressures felt by owners without these other ethical concerns would overtake that client-first orientation. But especially in periods, like now, where there’s a gold rush to invest in certain technology and offer equity and other financial incentives to underwrite it, there ends up being a lot of pressure put on this rule, with lawyers being tempted to sell equity stakes in their firms, and non-lawyers being keen to buy them. But the rule exists for a reason. Legal representation is so important to liberty and due process that a right to it is enshrined in the Constitution. Whereas no one is owed the profession as a profit center, nor could society afford for it to be recast as a normal profit-seeking business, which would come at the expense of the critical constitutional purpose we need it to serve.

Rule 5.5: Unauthorized Practice of Law. The unauthorized practice of law is ultimately defined mostly by local law, but the model rules themselves say that only those with licenses and subject to bar regulation are entitled to practice law. There have already been instances with some AI vendors trying to be hired to advise and litigate cases, in pretty clear contravention of this rule and associated local law. Plus there are states trying to pass bills preventing chatbots from dispensing legal advice.

The tricky thing is that it’s not always clear what is meant by dispensing legal advice. And there is some tension between these rules and access to justice concerns—in some situations it may perhaps be better to have a non-lawyer with some relevant expertise help people, rather than them potentially going without any support at all. But non-lawyers could get clients into a lot of trouble with ill-informed advice, and the same danger exists with AI. Some of these new tools, especially when well-designed for the legal realm, may be useful. But some, especially those of general purpose, are frequently terrible, and yet people still try to use them for legal advice and depend on unreliable if not completely wrong advice—in addition to risking the disclosure of private information in ways that may also tempt trouble.

In any case, lawyers certainly shouldn’t be letting AI tools dispense legal advice through their practice. When they get output from an AI they need to make sure it is output that is appropriate to rely on. Which is why the idea of AI providing significant savings seems such a dubious proposition, because either the lawyer is spending the time researching themselves, for instance, or, consistent with their supervisory duties, they are spending the time reviewing the research the AI produced, and in a system that itself is not AI and thus subject to the same information corruption issues.

AI is not yet in any sort of fit state where anyone can afford to rely on what it produces as the final, correct word on anything. Maybe someday it will be, but until we are sure that day has arrived, the ethical rules governing lawyers prevent clients from being unwilling beta testers. Even when lawyers get knowing, written consent from clients to use AI—which would be a best practice anyway—there are still pitfalls everywhere. And even if AI use is something clients may think they want, it may still be something lawyers are obligated to advise against.

Zuckerberg Is Right About Open, Decentralized AI. He’s Also The Last Person You Should Trust To Deliver It [Techdirt]

The reaction to Mark Zuckerberg’s 6,500 word AI manifesto, “The Future is for Everyone,” has been all over the map. Given the messenger and the topic, there’s plenty of reasonable skepticism. 404 Media called it “deranged.” TechCrunch pointed out that Zuck’s manifesto is “exactly why people don’t like AI.” But then you have groups like Fight for the Future (certainly no fans of Zuck) pointing out that Zuck is right about the importance of open source AI and the perils of centralization.

And they can all be right. As with any 6,500 word manifesto, there are plenty of things in the screed that are silly or out of touch. But there are a few important things, including on decentralization and open source. Ignoring the silly framing of “superintelligence” (a marketing term doing a lot of load-bearing work for tools that are, so far, getting pretty good at automating certain tasks, and still really bad at lots of other stuff), he repeatedly calls out his concerns about having these new tools be too centralized:

The notion that AI is so dangerous that the only safe path is an extreme concentration of power seems inherently problematic. Historically, hoping that an absolute power will benevolently provide for humanity if sufficiently enlightened has not led to safe or positive outcomes.

And, sure. I mean I’ve written a lot about this exact thing recently. But, um, it’s Zuckerberg and Meta that I was warning about.

Because in the social media realm, Mark Zuckerberg is the guy who is most responsible for taking us from an open, decentralized web where anyone could build to a closed, centralized data silo where if you tried to build on top of it, he’d sue you out of business.

So forgive me for not taking him seriously here. Warning that an “extreme concentration of power” is dangerous, and that hoping such a power “will benevolently provide for humanity if sufficiently enlightened” never ends well, seems like an astounding lack of self-awareness of Zuckerberg’s own role in centralizing the social internet, and positioning himself as society’s benevolent overlord.

It seems the only reason he’s pushing this vision now is… he’s losing the AI race. Badly. Funny how Zuck apparently discovered the perils of concentrated power at almost exactly the moment Meta stopped being the concentration of power that mattered, as the center of gravity shifted from social to AI.

Same with his support of open weight models. I’ve been talking about that as well for quite some time, and agree with basically everything he says here:

It is also important that the US and its allies lead the open source AI ecosystem that will make up a large percent of global AI use.

Foreign labs currently hold several advantages here since American labs have to comply with many additional restrictions on training data. US policy must reduce this additional friction if we want American open source models to lead over time. I do not believe restricting access to foreign open source models is an effective solution. Our goal should be for American open source models to be the best globally. This requires removing the hurdles that make it harder for American open source models to compete. Restricting people and companies from using the leading open source models — wherever they come from — will reduce the quality of AI accessible to them, and centralize AI rather than putting more power in people’s hands.

For the US to lead in open source, we will need to rethink our policies in several areas, including distillation and data use in training. The ability for models to learn from other models is an important principle of how the open source ecosystem works. All AI models are derived from human knowledge. Some have tried to frame distillation as harmful, but I think it is important to protect the principle that you can learn from anything you can observe. This is how the world works, and the US will not be able to lead if we restrict ourselves on this front.

But, again, Zuckerberg is the exact wrong messenger, and clearly not someone you can trust. While Meta has (like any big tech company) released and supported certain open source projects that are widely used today (mainly React and PyTorch), the company’s willingness to support openness almost always seems purely for the sake of market positioning.

Take, for example, Meta’s supposed support of the decentralized ActivityPub standard with Threads, its microblogging platform. The company initially announced that it would be building on the wider open social web and would contribute back to ActivityPub. This was positioned as being done for the good of the wider open social space. The more cynical take was that Meta knew it was way behind some others, and needed a hook to catch up. But as Threads became more successful, the company basically put that whole effort into “maintenance mode,” after the head of Threads gave an interview more or less admitting that ActivityPub integration just wasn’t that important to them any more.

And that’s before we get to the genuinely nutty parts — like the thought experiment where everyone having a superintelligent lawyer produces fairer justice rather than an unprecedented legal arms race, or the section where the answer to communities worried about data centers is a “community compact,” illustrated with $50,000 teacher bonuses in Louisiana.

Is it nice that Zuck is mentioning decentralization, less concentration of power, and open source? Sure. It’s better than the alternative. And, it’s great that Meta is now releasing new open weight models, meaning that both Google and Meta have released decently sophisticated open models that can run locally and that can compete with some of the powerful Chinese open models.

But do I actually think that Zuck cares one bit about those things? We have twenty plus years of data showing he cares about them right up until the moment he can exploit them to concentrate his own power and control.

None of that makes the good parts of his manifesto wrong. Open weights absolutely matter. Distillation restrictions are bad policy. Concentrating this stuff in three or four companies is a terrible idea. But those things were obviously true before Zuckerberg discovered them, and they’ll stay true after he abandons them.

So sure, welcome to the open, decentralized revolution, Mark. But we all know you’ll be the first to switch sides if you have the opportunity. On this stuff, principles matter and you’ve shown you’ve got none.

04:00 AM

Trump Rushes To Stock FCC With Personal Lackeys, Refuses To Seat Dem Commissioners [Techdirt]

When Trump FCC Boss Brendan Carr isn’t trampling free speech or harassing major networks for platforming comedians, he’s been illegally taking a hatchet to whatever’s left of media consolidation rules and telecom consumer protection oversight.

While he’s been pretty effective at this, Carr would find it even easier to convene meetings and hold agency votes if he had a full 3 member Republican FCC majority. So last Friday he appointed Danielle Thumann Severs, his own longtime personal legal aide, to fill the empty spot. She’d basically be there to do whatever Carr (and Trump) tell her to do.

Like, say, illegally help broadcasters consolidate. Or undermine the agency’s cybersecurity policies. Or collude with right wing executives to manufacture controversies in order to harass media companies that platform politicians Donald Trump and Trump Republicans are afraid of.

Technically Democrats are supposed to hold two FCC commissioner spots as a sort of counterbalance. But unsurprisingly, Carr has made no moves to appoint lone Democratic FCC Commissioner Anna Gomez (who has been a very vocal critic of Carr’s sloppy censorship efforts) to another five year term, nor fill the second vacant FCC Democratic seat.

Democrats have responded by stomping their feet a little:

“If President Trump wants to fill these positions, he should do them in a bipartisan way,” Sen. Ben Ray Luján (D-N.M.), the top Democrat on Commerce’s telecom subcommittee, told POLITICO. “I would certainly hope my Republican colleagues on the committee want to see some semblance of balance as well. Because who’s going to be the next president?”

Republicans do not, it should go without saying, “want to see some semblance of balance.” Over at the FTC, you might recall Trump illegally fired both Democratic FTC Commissioners, and is now just waiting for his lackey-stacked courts to change the law to suit his authoritarian whims (there are some interesting legal differences between the agencies here you may find useful to read about). And should Democrats regain the presidency, it’s very unlikely they respond with any sort of bare-knuckled political retort.

A fully-stocked Dem majority can’t do much beyond publish the occasional press release, but they can throw some procedural sand in the gears of Carr’s mindless deregulation and censorship efforts, which cumulatively can and do matter.

Ideally what guys like Brendan Carr want is an FCC full of bobble-heads to rubber stamp his censorship and “delete delete delete” agency “modernization” agenda, the latter of which often gets obscured in the press by his ham-fisted assault on journalism and the First Amendment. Prison monopolies, telecom monopolies, right wing broadcasters, and robocall scammers have been big fans of these efforts.

Severs has a tight window for confirmation given the looming midterms, but Republicans have a knack for getting their own terrible commissioners quickly confirmed, while center-right Democrats (like Joe Manchin) help Republicans delay and destroy the nomination of actual, popular reformers that work in the public interest (recall what happened to Gigi Sohn’s appointment to the FCC) via circular firing squad.

Some of the Democrats whining because Carr has failed to seat new Dem Commissioners contributed to that railroading of Sohn, I should point out. So it’s hard to believe these same Dems will respond to Trump and Carr’s illegal appointment blockade with much beyond a stern talking to and ambiguous calls for a return to “bipartisanship.”

Here, as with everywhere else, the Democratic party is in desperate need of a meaningful rebuild.

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Judiciary Committee Dems Open Investigation Into DOJ’s Reflecting Pool Revenge Prosecutions [Techdirt]

The current president continues to self-destruct. Fortunately for us, he insists on doing this publicly.

After handing a donor and an unproven company the massive job of redoing the Lincoln Memorial Reflecting Pool in “American flag blue” in hopes of being able to use it to celebrate himself during America’s 250th birthday, everything went tits tints up. The lining fell apart. And the “American flag blue” was soon replaced by an “Antifa Frog green” influx of algae.

Rather than demand an explanation from the no-bid contractors or simply decide to shift his focus elsewhere, Donald Trump immediately claimed (without evidence!) that this was the work of anti-American vandals. Trump’s claims were immediately echoed by both Interior Department head Doug Burgum and DC US Attorney Jeanine Pirro. While all three insisted there was tons of damning evidence to support their outlandish claims, to date not one of them has produced anything remotely resembling a smoking gun.

Instead, we’ve been (mis)treated to malicious prosecutions that were immediately abandoned after the government’s own star grand jury witness said the damage supposedly caused by vandals was actually the result of shoddy workmanship.

Pirro did the right thing and dismissed charges against the Reflecting Pool defendants, starting with former Olympian David Hearn — the only one of the defendants facing a felony charge. Trump wanted Hearn cuffed and stuffed as a trophy of his ability to beat the truth at its own game.

Pirro went to bat for herself and threw Burgum under the bus following these dismissals. But that didn’t stop both Burgum and Trump from continuing to insist the Reflecting Pool failures were the work of vandals, all while publicly verbally assaulting Pirro for doing the same thing both of these men are doing: trying to save their own asses.

To this day, Trump continues to insist mountains of evidence exist. But the administration’s smoking gun more resembles a weapon purchased on layaway that it has yet to make a payment on. And after several days of being undercut by facts in literal evidence, Trump has finally changed his tune… a bit.

“There was substantial damage to the Reflecting Pool, also but, unfortunately, there is no video or proof, other than the damage, itself,” he wrote on Truth Social. “We are working on the Pool, and it will reopen shortly. As with many jobs, there was also some contractor error done by rushing the job for a July 4th opening, but it was a very small area of this massive Pool, and was relatively inconsequential.”

These are surprising admissions, given the source. Not only does Trump admit (while doing as much downplaying as possible) that some damage might be the result of his no-bid contractors, he has also admitted the government has no evidence to support criminal charges against anyone.

That admission gives credence to Pirro’s claims during the DOJ’s dismissals — that the DOJ had been misled by Doug Burgum and his DOI lackeys to believe evidence existed to support the charges. But that hardly excuses Pirro, who basically insisted that everyone the DOJ had charged was guilty AF during her appearance on Fox News earlier this year.

Whatever Pirro did or didn’t know at the point she decided to start pursuing these investigations may become public knowledge in (hopefully) the near future. Not content to just let Trump, Pirro, and Burgum walk away from a handful of revenge prosecutions performed for the sole purpose of allowing Trump to punish other people for his own failures, members of the House Judiciary Committee are mobilizing the system of checks-and-balances to find out who knew what and when. Greg Sargent has the details for The New Republic:

Democrats on the House Judiciary Committee are set to launch an investigation into the decision to criminally charge Hearn and others over the Reflecting Pool fiasco, I’m told. Although Democrats are in the minority, their probe offers a blueprint for what they’ll pursue with subpoena power if they control the House in six months.

This week, Representative Jamie Raskin—the ranking Democrat on the Judiciary Committee and potentially its future chair—will formally demand that the Justice and Interior Departments turn over a wealth of documents related to the charging decisions made in this case.

While it’s true this will run into considerable opposition from GOP Committee members, it’s not like the minority party has to ask permission to open investigations. However, they will need some Republican support if they want this investigation to be anything more than symbolic.

But that’s not the only pressure the Trump DOJ is facing. David Hearn’s case may have been dismissed (but notably, without prejudice, which means the government can always try again), but his lawyers aren’t quitting. They’ve been demanding grand jury documents for weeks.

Eisen and Hearn’s other lawyers are not letting this drop. For some time now, they’ve been seeking access to full transcripts of the grand jury proceedings—including instructions that prosecutors gave jurors on charging guidelines—to determine whether prosecutors misled them to secure Hearn’s indictment.

Trump obviously wants to keep this thing alive. He may live to regret this decision. The people opposed to him and his actions want the same thing, but for the purpose of pursuing justice, rather than — like Trump and his administration — hoping to pervert it further.

12:00 AM

Pluralistic: Model collapse (12 Aug 2026) [Pluralistic: Daily links from Cory Doctorow]

->->->->->->->->->->->->->->->->->->->->->->->->->->->->-> Top Sources: None -->

Today's links



A collage made of architectural features from 'Variae Architecturae Formae' (1636), a collection of engravings. The architectural arches, buildings, fountains, etc, are layered atop each other and placed around each other to create an infinite, recombinant built environment.

Model collapse (permalink)

One of my favorite rhetorical and analytical moves is joining things together (showing that two different, seemingly unrelated ideas are aspects of the same phenomenon) and taking them apart (resolving a paradox by demonstrating that what appears to be one, contradictory thing is actually two different things that have been lumped together).

"Taking things apart" is a very useful framework for understanding AI. How do we resolve the (seeming) paradox that some skilled workers report wonderful results from their work with AI, while others are full of dire warnings about the lurking defects in their AI-assisted outputs? Simple: the first group are "centaurs" (humans who are assisted by machines) and the second are "reverse centaurs" (humans who have been pressed into service as peripherals for machines):

https://pluralistic.net/2025/12/05/pop-that-bubble/#u-washington

What are we to make of the people who've been fired by bosses who replaced them with AI, in light of the fact that AI is demonstrably not able to do their (former) jobs? Again, it's simple if you separate out two distinct phenomena: "AI can do your job" is the first. The second is: "Your boss is a credulous dolt who is infinitely horny for replacing lippy workers with pliable machines, which made him an easy mark for an AI salesman who convinced him to fire you and replace you with an AI that can't do your job":

https://pluralistic.net/2025/03/18/asbestos-in-the-walls/#government-by-spicy-autocomplete

This is also a useful move for understanding the AI investment bubble. It's not just billionaires who don't think other people are as real as they are and consequently their jobs can be done by chatbots. It's also billionaires who believe that bosses can be sold AI and don't care if the AI is defective, because that's your boss's problem after he buys the AI and fires you. They don't have to believe in AI in order to think it's a good investment: like an investor betting that Joe Rogan can sell millions of dollars' worth of peptides to desperate young men, they are assessing the sales potential, not the merits of the thing for sale:

https://pluralistic.net/2026/08/03/andor/#either

As useful as "taking things apart" is, "putting things together" is also a very important technique for assessing, critiquing and improving AI. In a stellar essay entitled "Temperature Zero for Culture: Why Everything Is Starting to Look the Same" by the data scientist Lauren Leek, we get a top-notch example of "putting things together":

https://laurenleek.substack.com/p/temperature-zero-for-culture-why

Leek's essay is one of those fabulous, wide-ranging, cross-disciplinary pieces, touching on urban design, music trends, synthetic LLM crowds, Netflix recommendation algorithms, and several other subjects, all seeking to resolve a(nother) (seeming) paradox: how is it that we have so much potential variety, but everything is so manifestly the same?

The answer is complicated and nuanced, but Leek's foundational point is that in a data-driven society, "predictions" are self-fulfilling prophecies. As Leek puts it: "Once prediction shapes the choices in front of us, we lose the ability to tell the difference between what people wanted and what the system made easy to want."

This is a pervasive issue across many domains. Leek says that economists call it "performativity," while machine learning researchers call it "model collapse" and urbanists call it "placelessness."

"Performativity" describes how, once a market has been modeled by economists, that model becomes the foundation for economic policy, which pushes the market to conform to the model:

https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691138497/do-economists-make-markets

"Model collapse" describes how machine learning models that are trained on their own predictions become incredibly bland, with all variety disappearing from the system's predictions:

https://pluralistic.net/2024/03/14/inhuman-centipede/#enshittibottification

This is hugely consequential: it's why bias proliferates through predictive policing algorithms: train a model with data from racist stop-and-frisks and it will predict that all the weapons and drugs in a city are to be found in Black and brown peoples' pockets. Turn those predictions into recommendations telling cops where to go look for weapons and drugs and they will double down on racist stops, producing even more biased training data, which turns into still more bias in the predictions:

https://hrdag.org/2016/10/10/predictive-policing-reinforces-police-bias/

"Placelessness" is the urbanist's name for "when everywhere optimises toward the same template." I think of it as Flinstones Syndrome, where the same background is looped behind Fred and Barney as they drive through Bedrock. In New York City, it's Citibank-bodega-Chipotle-Walgreens; in the Chicago suburbs, it's the strip malls with a Chili's, a gas station, and a big box store.

Leek proposes that these are all expressions of the same underlying phenomenon, a failure mode of data science that takes a world of "granular personal data" and arrives at a world where "personalisation produc[es] more sameness."

To these excellent examples, I'd add another one, from the world of monetary policy: Goodhart's Law, which holds that "When a measure becomes a target, it ceases to be a good measure":

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Goodhart%27s_law

Goodhart's Law captures a wide variety of phenomena. When Google first deployed Pagerank, they showed that by counting the inbound links to all the pages on the web, you could extract a signal about which pages were most important (because there was no reason to link to a page unless you found it noteworthy).

But once Pagerank became the dominant means by which web users found pages, counting links stopped being useful: first, because people used Pagerank to find the best pages and link to them, making it impossible for new pages to get the inbound links needed to supersede incumbent pages; and second, because it's easy for fraudsters to create inbound links for low-quality pages in bulk, once there's a reason to do so.

Counting inbound links was a world-beating retrospective way of predicting which page would best match a searcher's query, but once it shaped the world it sought to analyze, it ceased to be a good prospective way to predict which page would best match your queries.

Leek is a brilliant data scientist and an even better science communicator, with a knack for crisp, readily understood explanations. How can a world of granular, highly varied data turn into a world of homogeneous choices? Simple: start with a set of items ("cuisines, genres, shop types") and a standard algorithm for sorting them. Let users choose from those recommendations. The mode (average) of those choices "gets shown more, so it gets picked more, so the model grows more confident the mode is what people want, and the tails starve." Run this for a few rounds and the evenly distributed catalog of choices "collapses onto one dominant option."

This is intrinsic in the choices we make in designing recommendation algorithms, tilting them towards the likelihood of a successful recommendation. A recommender that wants to succeed every time will make the safest possible recommendations, "so an algorithm that is uncertain about you, and it is always at least a little uncertain, hedges toward the average."

Then she busts out a beautiful, perfect little statistics aphorism: "Personalisation under a standard loss function is regression to the collective mean with extra steps." That is to say, "regression to the mean" (the tendency of varied things to become more standardized) cannot be avoided with the standard personalization algorithm. That algorithm is going to play it safe, showing you things that are broadly palatable, and because your choices are constrained to the average, you will choose average things.

This is how recommendation systems – and other analytical tools that produce predictions that are then turned into action – force so many diverse phenomena (streets, markets, media recommendations) into sameness. The fact that these recommenders are self-fulfilling prophecies means that "they don't have to be right," only "listened to."

This explains the sameness of so many of London's high streets. Leek examines 640 shopping streets, characterizing 18,000 food places spread out across them, flagging all the chain restaurants. Her analysis shows that any two London streets will, on average, share about half of their "food profile."

Obviously, this is most pronounced on streets with chain outlets, and it doesn't take that many chain outlets before a street's sameness shoots up: "A relatively small number of repeated names is enough to make otherwise different streets resemble one another more." So why do streets with chains resemble one another so much? Because the chains use an algorithm (weighting footfall, proximity to train stations, demographics, and competitors) to decide where to put their restaurants. If a street with a Gail's Bakery on it feels like every other street with a Gail's Bakery, that's because Gail's only puts its restaurants in places that have highly similar characteristics, measured to a high degree of accuracy and controlled by a narrow set of tolerances.

In other words, every street that feels like it should have a Gail's will eventually get a Gail's, whereupon that street will feel even more like all the other streets that have a Gail's, because it will share one more common factor with those other streets (a Gail's).

Leek points here to her earlier work on pub closures in the UK. The UK has experienced an epidemic of pub closures, with thousands of pubs disappearing since 2016:

https://laurenleek.substack.com/p/britain-lost-14000-third-places-they

Her research found that the biggest predictor of a pub surviving was its similarity to the median pub; which is to say that the more distinctive a pub was, the more "character" it had, the more likely it was to close. Pubs that are different from the average pub are harder to categorize, which means they're harder for a bank manager to assess for creditworthiness or for a landlord to justify extending a long-term lease to. The algorithms used to allocate capital and real estate are also recommenders, and they also drive variety out of the system.

This same phenomenon acts on culture. In an age of music recommendation algorithms, hit songs are changing; today's songs use a smaller vocabulary of unique words and repeat those words more often:

Vocabulary richness, distinct words relative to length, has fallen by more than a quarter since the early 1960s, while the share of repeated lines has climbed by nearly a third. The modern hit says less and says it more often, because the hook that works gets repeated.

But that's not the whole story! While each song resembles itself more ("saying less more often"), within that constraint, there's far more variety today than before: a given song's (constrained) vocabulary has grown more distinct when compared to all the other songs' vocabularies. Songs repeat the words they use, but the words repeated in songs are getting more different.

For Leek, this is the key to understanding the whole phenomenon and (more importantly) doing something about it. Music recommendation systems optimized for a singable hook, but did not optimize on any of the other variables in songs, so those dimensions acquired a broader range, even as the optmized variable got flatter and narrower.

This means that the tendency of recommenders to "flatten the world" isn't a single blunt outcome: it depends on which dimension we choose to flatten through recommendation, and who chooses to flatten that dimension.

A media recommender optimizes for consumption, showing you a tractable set of things it believes you'll watch, read or listen to. When you choose from among this limited set, the recommender takes note of that fact and shows you more of the same, pushing everything to a greige median. All the movies, books and songs you might have liked that were omitted from that initial set are excluded from being recommended in the future. The features of that media that you might have appreciated "decay out of consideration." They are never tested for desirability. The model collapses.

How badly does it collapse? Leek cites Movietweetings' data on which movies people watch: out of a million public movie ratings, half relate to the top 2% of movies in the set. There's 38,000 films in the set, but just 380 titles account for 40% of the ratings. Leek argues (persuasively) that this isn't because recommenders are good at "knowing your taste" – rather, they are good at "narrowing the menu."

Leek relates this to her work on creating LLM "personas" – synthetic populations meant to mimic the tastes and proclivities of real groups of people, that you can interrogate "before you spend money asking actual humans." While this would be useful for many applications, "it fails in exactly the way this whole essay is about."

Leek went to enormous lengths to reproduce the traits that make people interesting to study in aggregate, painstakingly replicating the ways that social connections, psychological outlook and demographic factors predict people's beliefs. The result was a set of LLM personas with "elaborate stories" about how they differed from one another, but whose survey responses about planned actions were homogeneous in a way that real populations are not.

This, Leek writes, is the same force that homogenizes other data-driven predictors. Because she'd ordered her LLM to reproduce the statistically validated relationships between different factors that predict a person's beliefs, each synthetic persona was a homogenized average. It's like the paradox of "The Average Man," where military uniforms sized to the average of all service personnel fit no one, because no one is average:

https://archive.org/details/DTIC_AD0010203

The thing is (as Leek points out) the idea that synthetic personas are a good way to understand the preferences of a real population is not a harmless delusion: it's a product that's being actively sold to governments, campaigning politicians and marketers. It's a self-fulfilling prophecy that drives governance, political campaigns and product design to the same homogeneous median that is making every shopping street in London feel the same.

This matters. As Leek writes, ecologists have long understood the importance of variety for systemic resilience: they call it "the insurance value of biodiversity." A diverse system has reservoirs of species and variation that may not be optimized for how things stand now, but that can move into niches created when things change in ways that lay waste to the previously dominant organisms. As anyone whose favorite banana went extinct can tell you, homogeneity works well, but diversity fails well:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gros_Michel

The brittleness of algorithm-induced homogeneity is compounded by the fact that recommenders obscure the true preferences of people. If you watch two Scandinavian crime dramas after Netflix recommends them to you, it will keep showing you more Scandy crime for the next decade – even if there's another kind of programming that you'd vastly prefer (if only you knew about it). This means that decision-makers who choose which shows will get made in the future will keep on funding their safe Danish detectives, to the exclusion of whatever might emerge from the same weird attractor that produced the K-Pop Demon Hunter fortune.

Transpose this failure mode onto states, bank managers and landlords, and we see whole ranges of policies, businesses and activities that never come into existence, despite the popularity, prosperity and joy they might bring us.

But Leek doesn't end with this worrisome note. Instead, she identifies this whole thing – model collapse, placelessness, performativity, even Goodhart's Law – as an expression of one of the best-understood tradeoffs in computer science: "exploration vs exploitation":

Any system learning from feedback has to divide its effort between exploiting what already scores well and exploring options it hasn’t tried, in case they’re better.

Computer scientists have long understood that focusing on exploitation to the exclusion of exploration is a trap that locks you into "the first decent option" so you can never discover the best one.

Which means that this algorithmic homogeneity has a well-understood corrective: "forcing exploration back in." The problem is that markets hate this kind of exploration. A company that lives and dies by how many clicks it gets is never going to sacrifice 20% of its traffic by showing its users weird, untested options that score worse than the median because these weird things have never had a chance to prove that they are desirable.

This is a classic market failure, and, as Leek points out, there are regulatory responses in the UK (the Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act) and the EU (the Digital Services Act), both of which require the largest platforms to open up their recommendation systems, but so far, regulators have focused on "online harms" rather than variety (though the DSA does require platforms to offer algorithmic recommendations that are not based on your personal traits).

Leek identifies this willingness of states to set conditions for algorithm design as a means by which "exploration" can be forced back into the system. She's also bullish on interoperability, so that users can leave platforms with bad recommenders, without losing access to their media or social circles. As she writes, "the deepest discipline on a feed that has trapped you is the credible ability to leave it and take your data with you." I couldn't agree more:

https://pluralistic.net/2023/01/08/watch-the-surpluses/

She's less hopeful about individual responses. Demanding that you be an "adventurous consumer" is a way of letting systems off the hook. When every street has the same restaurants and every bookshop has the same books and the people in your life are all locked into one of two social media platforms, "choosing wisely" only gets you so far. Shopping isn't politics!

https://pluralistic.net/2026/05/21/purity-culture/#stop-fucking-that-chicken

Leek is a superb writer. After reading this piece yesterday, I sent it to half a dozen people and then read everything else in Leek's newsletter archives. Not only is it all brilliant, but I also realized that she'd written one of the most memorable articles about cities and platforms I've read in the last year, "How Google Maps quietly allocates survival across London’s restaurants – and how I built a dashboard to see through it":

https://laurenleek.substack.com/p/how-google-maps-quietly-allocates

I should have added Leek's newsletter to my RSS reader when I read that last December. I've rectified that oversight! What a fantastic thinker, scientist and communicator! If she isn't being relentlessly pestered by editors and literary agents offering her a book deal, then it really does prove that the recommender systems are elevating the bland median over the thoroughly, delightfully spiky outliers.


Hey look at this (permalink)



A shelf of leatherbound history books with a gilt-stamped series title, 'The World's Famous Events.'

Object permanence (permalink)

#25yrsago Awful, stupid Wired report on Dutch hacker camp https://web.archive.org/web/20011007084604/https://www.wired.com/news/culture/0,1284,46033,00.html

#25yrsaog Excellent NYT story about the internal contradictions of the DMCA https://memex.craphound.com/2001/08/13/excellent-nyt-story-about-the/

#20yrsago Our faulty intuition about open systems https://www.ft.com/content/64167124-263d-11db-afa1-0000779e2340

#20yrsago Defending against the last plot won’t save us from the next one https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2006/08/terrorism_secur.html

#20yrsago NBC: Hair-gel terrorists posed no risk last week https://web.archive.org/web/20060813194630/http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/14320452/

#15yrsago AT&T merger leak: it’s all about raising prices and reducing competition https://web.archive.org/web/20110920222524/http://www.broadbandreports.com/shownews/Leaked-ATT-Letter-Demolishes-Case-For-TMobile-Merger-115652

#10yrsago What’s inside a Tiki Bird? https://miehana.blogspot.com/2016/08/fancy-feathers-restoring-tiki-room-birds.html

#5yrsago End of the line for Reaganomics https://pluralistic.net/2021/08/13/post-bork-era/#manne-down

#5yrsago Smart cities are neither, 2021 edition https://pluralistic.net/2021/08/13/post-bork-era/#our-streets

#1yrago Maga's boss class think they are immune to American carnage https://pluralistic.net/2025/08/13/then-they-came-for-me/#boss-politics


Upcoming appearances (permalink)

A photo of me onstage, giving a speech, pounding the podium.



A screenshot of me at my desk, doing a livecast.

Recent appearances (permalink)



A grid of my books with Will Stahle covers..

Latest books (permalink)



A cardboard book box with the Macmillan logo.

Upcoming books (permalink)

  • "The Post-American Internet," a geopolitical sequel of sorts to Enshittification, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2027

  • "Unauthorized Bread": a middle-grades graphic novel adapted from my novella about refugees, toasters and DRM, FirstSecond, April 20, 2027

  • "Enshittification, Why Everything Suddenly Got Worse and What to Do About It" (the graphic novel), Firstsecond, 2027

  • "The Memex Method," Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 2027



Colophon (permalink)

Today's top sources:

Currently writing:

  • “Once Is Enemy Action,” a science fiction novel about the origins of modern technofascism. Today's words: 546 (4161 total).

  • "The Post-American Internet," a sequel to "Enshittification," about the better world the rest of us get to have now that Trump has torched America. Fourth draft completed. Submitted to editor.

  • A Little Brother short story about DIY insulin PLANNING


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Hollywood’s UK “Omnibus” Pirate Site Blocking Order Surfaces Through Cloudflare [TorrentFreak]

pirate flagsWhen the Motion Picture Association (MPA) described its new UK blocking order to WIPO in May, it was presented as a key step in the fight against online piracy.

The “omnibus” order would make it easier and quicker to block new domain names and pirate site brands that pop up in response to blocking efforts.

According to the MPA, it allows Hollywood studios to seek blocking of any “structurally infringing audiovisual piracy services that meet defined criteria, without having to bring a fresh court application for each new domain or site name available in the future.”

Cited but Inaccessible

As we reported at the time, the order itself was nowhere to be found. The judgment was not on BAILII or in the National Archives, and none of the targeted ISPs had mentioned it. The MPA’s summary was the only public account.

The significance of the order was clear though. The MPA prominently featured it at WIPO and the UK ruling was also referenced and used as an example in a Canadian site blocking order that was handed down last month.

Canada’s Federal Court noted that the purpose of the order is to “address increased fragmentation in the Internet piracy landscape” that is the result of people switching from blocked to non-blocked sites and domains.

This “expanded scope” order, as Canada’s Federal Court called it, allows Hollywood studios and broadcasters to add unrelated sites to the blocklist, without having to go back to court. However, the UK order that it was based on remained unpublished, until recently.

This week, we spotted a new transparency filing from Cloudflare, which was added to the Lumen database. This filing references the UK omnibus order and also attaches a copy of it.

Omnibus Order Details Surface

That attachment is, as far as we know, the first public copy of the omnibus order. It is headed a “Public Version,” a copy with a confidential schedule removed, which confirms the broad powers the MPA described as well as other details.

The order, handed down by Mr Justice Mellor on 7 May 2026, was requested by Columbia, Disney, Netflix, Paramount, Universal and Warner Bros. The respondents are the UK’s six largest ISPs: BT, EE, Plusnet, Sky, TalkTalk and Virgin Media.

The order (public version)

hc order

Like previous UK blocking orders, the ISPs are required to block access to a series of websites. In this case, the first part of schedule 1 specifically lists 345movie.nl and 456movie.nl, cineby.app, movies2watch.watch and streamm4u.com.co. These are the ‘seeds,’ followed by an open-ended category in part 2 of the same schedule.

The ‘seed’ domains and brands

schedule 1

Since 2022, UK court orders also support subsequent blockades of similarly branded websites. The latest order expands this power to a much broader list of pirate sites, regardless of the brand used, as long as these are similar in functionality.

“[E]ach Part 2 Target Website has essentially the same mode of operation as one or more of the Part 1 Target Websites in so far as it enables users to stream film/audiovisual content by indexing and aggregating links to unauthorised copies of such content,” the order reads.

There is a clear set of boxes newly added sites have to tick, so future expansions are not unlimited. In this case, all pirate movie streaming sites that are available in the UK and unresponsive to complaints, should be fair game.

The ‘add site’ requirements

addedreq

The order does not come with a transparency clause that requires the list of blocked domains to be made public, which makes it impossible for the public and journalists to review the blocking efforts.

Voluntary Expansion

Importantly, adding new sites to the blocklist does not involve a judge. When the studios flag a new Part 2 site, they notify the ISPs that the conditions are met, and it is added. There is no court hearing or independent review.

The order states that the ISPs are “wholly reliant on the Applicants accurately identifying” the URLs to block, and that they “have no obligation to verify whether the Applicants’ or their agents’ determination is correct.” The studios are in charge of expanding the blockades.

These expansions are not limited to the ISPs either. As mentioned earlier, Cloudflare published the order without being a party. This is because the American company voluntarily blocks targeted sites if these use its CDN services. These blocks are limited to the UK, as we documented before.

Error HTTP 451

error 451

As shown above, Cloudflare shows an Error HTTP 451 to UK visitors that try to access movies2watch.watch, explaining that the site is unavailable for legal reasons.

Guardrails and Limitations

The order is not without safeguards. In addition to the earlier mentioned expansion requirements, site operators or other people caught up in these blocking efforts have the right to object.

Importantly, rightsholders are also strictly prohibited from asking ISPs to block an IP address if the underlying server also hosts legitimate, non-infringing websites. This should prevent overblocking incidents.

Finally, there is also a relatively short time limit on the order, which expires after six months.

“This Order shall cease to have effect at 23:59pm on the date 6 months from the date of this Order, unless the Court orders otherwise,” it reads.

This doesn’t mean that the blocking order will cease to exist after that. In practice, it means that the Hollywood studios will return to court to request an extension. While there is no formal blocklist review, if there are any concerns they can be brought up then as well.

As far as we know, the judgment linked to the order has yet to be added to BAILII or the National Archives. Ironically, we only know of it because of the transparency efforts of Cloudflare, which isn’t even a formal party in the case.

A copy of the public “omnibus” blocking order is available here (pdf). The Cloudflare blocking notice, published at the Lumen Database, can be found here.

From: TF, for the latest news on copyright battles, piracy and more.

Wednesday 2026-08-12

11:00 PM

Ninth Circuit Rewrites Section 230 To Remove The Part That Actually Mattered [Techdirt]

For all the talk of “reforming” or “repealing” Section 230 in Congress, the fact is that the courts over the past three or four years have effectively chipped away so steadily at the law that it’s lost a significant chunk of its usefulness. The latest comes from the Ninth Circuit, which ruled earlier this week that Section 230 is not, in fact, an immunity from lawsuit, but merely a defense against liability. This may sound like a procedural technicality — and, indeed, the coverage of this case from the likes of Reuters covers it as a boring procedural story — but it’s a huge deal.

To get there, the panel had to rewrite the history of Section 230 and wave off a whole stack of its own prior rulings as either sloppy word choice or mere dicta.

To understand why this ruling is such a big deal, you first have to understand Section 230’s true benefit: it would get bogus cases tossed at the earliest moment. This is the entire key to why Section 230 is important. The point of Section 230 is to put the liability on the party actually violating the law — which would be the creator of the content, and not the intermediary tool they use to host/distribute that content. But the mechanism used to protect speech is that it gets the cases against intermediaries dismissed very early (aggrieved parties can still sue the actual speakers).

If it didn’t do this, the vast majority of the benefits of Section 230 would be lost. Indeed, in one of the many early Section 230 cases, the Ninth Circuit’s Alex Kozinski colorfully described why Section 230 immunity was so important in the famous Roommates case:

Websites are complicated enterprises, and there will always be close cases where a clever lawyer could argue that something the website operator did encouraged the illegality. Such close cases, we believe, must be resolved in favor of immunity, lest we cut the heart out of section 230 by forcing websites to face death by ten thousand duck-bites, fighting off claims that they promoted or encouraged—or at least tacitly assented to—the illegality of third parties…

Every bit of that bolded section is important — and it’s what the court is now ignoring. First, it’s Kozinski not just calling out that Section 230 provides “immunity” but that without it, we would “cut the heart out of Section 230” by “forcing websites to face death by ten thousand duck-bites.” Kozinski was exactly correct, and Section 230’s authors, Ron Wyden and Chris Cox, have said he got it right (I was at a conference years ago where both Cox and Kozinski were present, and when Cox said this interpretation was correct, Kozinski made a joke to the effect that it wasn’t often that a priest got word directly from God that his interpretation of the scriptures was correct).

The operative aspect of 230 is that it’s an immunity that gets rid of those cases early. Because without that, the mere threat of litigation would force many websites to simply remove content to avoid the cost of going through litigation. That’s the duck bites part of this.

And part of what’s important about it being an immunity is that if the district court refuses to dismiss the case on Section 230 grounds, you can immediately appeal that (“an interlocutory appeal”) to the appeals court to say that the district court got this wrong… rather than having to go through the entire litigation process (the thing you’re supposed to be immune from) and then telling an appeals court about the error. By not allowing an interlocutory appeal, it would do away with the element of Section 230 that makes it so effective.

Yet, on Monday, the same Ninth Circuit basically said “eh… nope.” Yes, the ruling was specifically procedural, but it was procedural on that point. Meta and TikTok — and, by extension, every other company facing these suits — have to get pecked to death by ducks first, and only afterwards can they tell an appeals court they never should have been pecked at all. The “procedural” rejection by the Ninth Circuit means that more than 3,000 lawsuits filed against these companies can move forward. It’s not (yet) the full ten thousand duck bites Kozinski warned about, but it’s in the ballpark. And we’re already seeing those duck bites in action.

What’s incredible, though, is just how confused the panel is about all of this. Judge Jacqueline Nguyen, writing for the court, starts by getting the history of Section 230 wrong:

The drafting history adds weight to the view that Congress employed a belt and suspenders approach. In the House bill, where section 230 originated, subsection (e)(3) contained only the first sentence. See H.R. 1555, amend. 744, 104th Cong. (1995), 141 Cong. Rec. H8469 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995). In reconciling a competing bill, the Senate adopted the House proposal “with minor modifications,” including what is now the second sentence. S. Rep. No. 104-230, at 194 (1996) (Conf. Rep.). It would be surprising if these “minor modifications” included the addition of immunity from suit.

However, as Jeff Kosseff — literally the guy who wrote the very comprehensive book on the history of Section 230 — notes, Judge Nguyen is exactly wrong.

In declining to provide interlocutory review of a denial of Section 230 protections to Meta, the Ninth Circuit misrepresented 230’s legislative history to conclude that 230 provides a defense to liability rather than immunity.

Jeff Kosseff (@jkosseff.bsky.social) 2026-08-10T22:24:09.311Z

Kosseff notes that his book goes through this, though so does the law review article he published a few years ago, which details how Section 230 changed during the conference committee and how it was, deliberately, about making internet intermediaries immune from lawsuits. He points out that while the initial draft of the law was supposed to prohibit the FCC from regulating the internet, during the reconciliation process, they deliberately “clarified the intention to preempt litigation” by adding in that “No cause of action may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with this section.”

If it was just about being a defense against liability, they would not have included “no cause of action may be brought.” But the ruling this week claims that Congress was just being superfluous there:

Meta argues that the phrase “[n]o cause of action may be brought” implies immunity from suit because reading it to provide immunity from liability would render the phrase “no liability may be imposed” superfluous. Id. § 230(e)(3). Not necessarily. Congress may have included “cause of action” to encompass suits for injunctive and declaratory relief, since “liability” could be read to encompass only damages. At the same time, Congress may have prohibited the imposition of “liability” to encompass orders by state administrative agencies, which may not involve causes of action. Whatever Congress’s reason for including both phrases, “sometimes the better overall reading of the statute contains some redundancy”

The ruling this week then dismisses all of the many other times that the Ninth Circuit (and other courts) said that 230 was an immunity from suit by basically saying “eh, previous courts were sloppy with language” along with “and when we said that it was never that important.”

It is true that we have used the phrase “immunity” somewhat loosely in our section 230 jurisprudence; although we generally describe it as “immunity from liability,” we sometimes describe it as “immunity from suit.” But none of this usage is binding, because we have never addressed whether the denial of a section 230 defense is a collateral order…

In a footnote, the ruling lists off many (though not all) of the times the same Ninth Circuit has said “immunity from suit.”

See, e.g., Lemmon v. Snap, Inc., 995 F.3d 1085, 1087, 1090 (9th Cir. 2021) (describing section 230(c)(1) as immunity “from . . . suit” and “from liability”); Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1099–1100 (stating that section 230 “protects certain internetbased actors from certain kinds of lawsuits” and that it “protects from liability”); Zango, Inc. v. Kaspersky Lab, Inc., 568 F.3d 1169, 1173, 1175 (9th Cir. 2009) (describing the statute as “plainly immuniz[ing] from suit” and providing “protection . . . for civil liability”); Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1122, 1125 (referring to “immunity from liability” and “immunity from suit”).

So, in order to reach this result, the Ninth Circuit needed to reinterpret and dismiss both many prior Ninth Circuit cases, claiming they were just sloppy with their language and the literal text of Section 230, again insisting that the “no cause of action may be brought” was just the drafters being redundant, rather than the much more likely (and as Kosseff’s history has shown, accurate) interpretation that the law was literally written to prevent intermediaries from having to face these kinds of lawsuits entirely.

It is true that the Tenth Circuit (and only the Tenth Circuit) has also ruled this way, but the Ninth Circuit has way more impact because a huge number of internet companies are based in California, which is covered by the Ninth Circuit. And many other circuits have ruled the other way. In Nemet v. ConsumerAffairs, the Fourth Circuit talked about “a sphere of immunity” created by 230 and points out that:

Section 230 immunity, like other forms of immunity, is generally accorded effect at the first logical point in the litigation process. As we have often explained in the qualified immunity context, “immunity is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability” and “it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.” Brown v. Gilmore, 278 F.3d 362, 366 n.2 (4th Cir. 2002) (quotations omitted) (emphasis in original). We thus aim to resolve the question of § 230 immunity at the earliest possible stage of the case because that immunity protects websites not only from “ultimate liability,” but also from “having to fight costly and protracted legal battles.”

In the Sixth Circuit, in the Dirty World case, the court quotes the Eleventh Circuit’s Almeida v. Amazon ruling to note:

The majority of federal circuits have interpreted the CDA to establish broad “federal immunity to any cause of action that would make service providers liable for information originating with a third-party user of the service.”

So while the Ninth Circuit argues that this is some sort of novel issue… it’s simply not. Other than the Tenth Circuit in that one case, almost every other court (including the Ninth Circuit itself) has always held that Section 230 provides for immunity from suit, which as the record and the authors make clear, was exactly the point.

Technically, the panel isn’t wrong that none of those other cases squarely held that a 230 denial is immediately appealable. Courts aren’t bound by things they assumed rather than decided. But there’s a difference between “no court has ruled on this” and “every court to touch this for thirty years, plus both authors of the statute, absolutely understood it the same way to the point that they never needed to directly say so.” The panel treats three decades of consistent understanding as if it were a typo.

And while this latest ruling notes that this is fine because the court can always “revisit the issue of section 230 immunity at a later stage of the proceedings,” once again that destroys the very point of 230. This new ruling even points out that the district court is skeptical the plaintiffs even have a case here:

The court expressed its “skepticism” about plaintiffs’ ability to proceed on their “novel” failure-to-warn theories in light of section 230 but allowed the claims to proceed “for now” given that the litigation was at an “early juncture” and the law regarding section 230 immunity was “in some flux.”

But, once again, that’s the entire point of Section 230! To end these weak cases early!

Indeed, going all the way back to the Roommates case that we mentioned up top, where Kozinski coined his duck bites line, what was most memorable about that case is that the ruling denied Section 230’s protections to Roommates.com over one feature (though dismissed other claims because of it). And Roommates then had to spend four more years litigating the case… only to still win many years, and many millions of dollars later.

That, on its own, shows how important 230 is in getting rid of cases early. The whole point is that most of these kinds of cases are losers for their plaintiffs in the long run on First Amendment or other grounds. The benefit of Section 230 is that the companies don’t have to waste many years and many millions of dollars to get to that final conclusion. But the Ninth Circuit, apparently no longer caring about death by ten thousand duck bites, now says that such cases are free to proceed without interlocutory review at the very point it matters most.

Now the internet companies have a choice: they can ask the entire Ninth Circuit to review en banc, even as that’s a crapshoot with its current roster. They can ask the Supreme Court to weigh in, when we already know a few of the Justices hate Section 230. Or, they can submit to the first 3,000 duck bites, and see if they survive.

Which is the real irony here: for all the years of congressional threats to gut Section 230, it turns out the courts are the ducks, and there’s less of the law left after every bite.

10:00 PM

The magic of a two-year waitlist [Seth Godin's Blog on marketing, tribes and respect]

The Decware triode amp is the best low-power stereo amp I’ve ever heard. And it’s a bargain. If you have the right speakers, it’s an extraordinary device.

And there’s a two-year waitlist. 2000 people, 11 pages long.

This approach to timing and production serves all the people that matter to the company.

Employees are free to do their best work without rushing.

The operation is able to be right-sized instead of more-sized.

The risks are reduced, since the infinite loop of expansion is almost always followed by the doom loop of contraction.

Would-be customers who are impatient can go elsewhere or even buy a used one.

And the folks who are upgrading to this final, ultimate purchase of equipment discover that the value of the transaction goes up commensurate with how long they have to wait. In a world built on instant convenience, perhaps this is something worth waiting for.

Most MBAs would tell Steve to raise prices, ramp up production, automate, outsource and maximize profits.

But perhaps the resilient and generative approach is precisely the right choice. The hard parts are: 1. making something people are willing to wait for, and 2. having the guts and commitment to make them wait.

Pick your customers, pick your future. And often, entrepreneurs forget that they don’t work for Milton Friedman. We can choose the work we do and the value we create, and we can decide what better looks like.

      

Kanji of the Day: 鼻 [Kanji of the Day]

✍14

小3

nose, snout

はな

耳鼻科   (じびか)   —   otolaryngology
鼻水   (はなみず)   —   nasal mucus
鼻血   (はなじ)   —   nosebleed
鼻炎   (びえん)   —   rhinitis
鼻の下   (はなのした)   —   upper lip
副鼻腔炎   (ふくびくうえん)   —   sinusitis
鼻息   (はないき)   —   nasal breathing
鼻歌   (はなうた)   —   humming
鼻先   (はなさき)   —   tip of nose
耳鼻咽喉科   (じびいんこうか)   —   otorhinolaryngology

Generated with kanjioftheday by Douglas Perkins.

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